Criminal Law by Dobson, Mark M.
Nova Law Review
Volume 20, Issue 1 1995 Article 3
Criminal Law
Mark M. Dobson∗
∗
Copyright c©1995 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law
Mark M. Dobson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 67
II. NONCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS ................... 68
A. Felony Petit Theft .......................... 68
B. Robbery ................................ 73
C. Sexual Offenses Involving Children ............. 75
D. Leaving an Accident Involving Death or Personal
Injury .................................. 80
E. Manslaughter .............................. 84
F. Felony Offense Reclassification ................ 87
G. Attempted Felony Murder .................... 93
H. Voluntary Intoxication and Mental Disease ....... 96
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA
CRIMINAL LAWS .............................. 101
A. Vagueness .............................. 101
1. Open House Parties .................... 102
2. Exploitation of Aged Persons or Disabled
Adults ............................. 104
B. Right to Privacy Challenges to Crimes Involving
Sexual Relations with Children ............... 108
1. Lewd, Lascivious, or Indecent Assault
Upon a Child ........................ 109
2. Carnal Intercourse with Unmarried Person Under
Eighteen Years ....................... 110
C. Improper Delegation of Powers ............... 112
IV. CONCLUSION ................................ 116
I. INTRODUCTION
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1995.1 As with past survey articles on criminal law, this one does not
discuss issues regarding the death penalty as that topic is so specialized that
it deserves special treatment on its own. Likewise, the application of
Florida's sentencing guidelines is also a special topic excluded from this
article's discussion. Cases from Florida's district courts of appeal are
mentioned in the footnotes to the extent that their inclusion supplements the
textual discussion. Similarly, new legislation is mentioned when it relates
to the continuing importance of a discussed case.
Even after cases mainly involving the death penalty and the sentencing
guidelines are eliminated, the survey still does not discuss every Supreme
Court of Florida case. Those cases which merely discuss the application of
standard, or fairly standard, fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have
also been eliminated. This article is divided into two main parts. The first
part discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major questions
of substantive criminal law that do not involve constitutional questions. The
second part discusses supreme court cases concerning constitutional
challenges to some of Florida's substantive criminal law statutes.
II. NONCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Felony Petit Theft
Florida Statutes section 812.014 defines the crime of theft.2
1. The author has chosen for his cut-off point decisions reported up to, and including
655 So. 2d. Thus, some Supreme Court of Florida cases decided before July 1, 1995 are not
included in this article.
2. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1) (Supp. 1994) defines theft as:
knowingly obtain[ing] or us[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obtain or to use, the
property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom.
(b) Appropriate the property to [the accused's] own use or to the use of any
person entitled thereto.
Id.
This subsection's language makes it clear that section 812.014 is intended to be an
omnibus theft statute. Thus, the definition of theft not only includes the former common law
offense of larceny but also includes such former offenses as embezzlement. See, e.g., State
v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. 1986) (finding that a bookkeeper who stole her
employer's business assets would now be guilty of theft under section 812.014(1)). The
definition also includes what would otherwise be considered attempted thefts as well as
completed thefts. State v. Sykes, 434 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 1983). Thus, there is no crime
of attempted theft in Florida. Id.
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Section 812.014 also establishes various degrees of this offense A
convicted defendant can be guilty of as low an offense as a second-degree
misdemeanor and as high an offense as a first-degree felony for grand theft.
The offense degree depends on the value of the property stolen or on the
presence of special aggravating factors.
Theft of property worth less than $300 is a second-degree misdemean-
or unless special factors exist to raise the offense's degree.4 Generally,
proof of the value of a stolen item, or items, is essential to establishing more
than a second-degree misdemeanor petit theft,' unless a special aggravating
factor exists.
There are two types of special aggravating factors: repeated thefts by
the same person and the type of property stolen. While theft of property
worth less than $300 is usually a second-degree misdemeanor, the crime
becomes a first-degree misdemeanor if the offender has committed one
previous theft, and becomes a third-degree felony if the offender has
committed two or more previous thefts.'
Questions have arisen as to whether the circumstances making a theft
more than a second-degree misdemeanor must be specifically alleged in the
charging document. While the general answer to this was "yes," doubt still
remained as to whether the state's failure to allege the prior theft convictions
relied upon to aggravate a petit theft to a felony made raising the offense
level impossible. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
3. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(a)-(d). These subsections do not establish separate theft
definitions but merely set the degree of the theft offense involved. For further discussion on
the degrees of theft offenses, see Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1992).
4. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d).
5. E.g., M.H. v. State, 614 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
proof that stolen property worth $100 was insufficient to make the crime a grand theft
because § 812.014(1)(c)I made $300 the statutory dividing point between grand and petit
theft); S.M.M. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding proof
of value essential to degree of theft offense); F.W. v. State, 459 So. 2d 1129, 1129 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding the State's failure to prove value required reducing a grand
theft conviction to a petit theft conviction).
6. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d). Until 1992, the previous conviction which would
increase the degree of an otherwise second-degree misdemeanor petit theft was statutorily
limited to previous petit thefts. Thus, in State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1988), the
court found that two prior grand theft convictions could not be used to reclassify Jackson's
petit theft. However, in 1992 the language of § 812.014(2)(d) was changed from "conviction
for petit theft" to "conviction of any theft," thus indicating the legislature's intent to overrule
Jackson. Ch. 92-79, §, 1992 FLA. LAWS 741, 742 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d)
(1993).
1995]
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Phillips7 held that a charge entitled "Felony Petit Theft" citing to the statute
which defines the substantive crime and reciting facts which would support
a conviction under the statute was not fundamentally defective for failing to
allege the prior theft convictions which made the offense a felony when the
defense had not moved to dismiss or object to the charge. 8 However, six
years later in State v. Rodriguez,9 while discussing the offense of felony
DUI, the supreme court considered "whether a charging document must
specifically allege ... [the needed] prior convictions ... when charging a
defendant with felony DUI to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court and to
comply with due process of law."' Since the State conceded that prior
DUI convictions were essential elements of felony DUI, the court found that
"it necessarily follows that the requisite notice... [of them] must be given
in the charging document."" The Rodriguez court noted that the sole issue
in Phillips was whether the charging document was so defective that it
deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case, not whether the
charge was so defective that it could not support a conviction." The court
in Rodriguez agreed that a charging document, titled "Felony Petit Theft"
and merely citing the appropriate subsection of section 812.014, was
sufficient to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. 3  Thus, when the
defense did not object to the court's jurisdiction beforehand, there was no
defect in proceeding to trial. However, the court found that when the
defense was not notified of any alleged prior convictions, the prior
convictions could not be used afterwards to make the petit theft a felony.'
4
7. 463 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1985).
8. Id. at 1137-38. Phillips arose in connection with a post-conviction objection to the
circuit court's jurisdiction over the charge. Id. at 1137. Although the state did not allege
the two prior theft convictions in the charge itself, the state gave written notice at the
defendant's arraignment of its intention to enhance his offense to a felony based upon the
two prior petit theft convictions. Id. While it was not specifically mentioned in the court's
holding, this written notice appears to be a significant factor distinguishing the result in
Phillips from later decisions.
9. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991).
10. Id. at 1263.
11. Id. at 1265.
12. Id. at 1264.
13. Id.
14. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266-67. Unlike Phillips, the state in Rodriguez did not
give pre-trial notice to the defense concerning any details of the accused's alleged prior
convictions. Id.
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Despite Rodriguez, there was still conflict among the district courts of
appeal' 5 over whether prior theft convictions must be alleged in the
charging document itself to charge an accused with felony petit theft.
During this past year, the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have
conclusively resolved this issue with its decision in Young v. State. 6
There after his conviction for petit theft, the state moved successfully to
enhance Young's offense to a felony. 7 The effect of this was to change
Young's prison sentence from five to ten years. 8 The Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed, 9 but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed.2"
The court noted that felony petit theft had long been considered a substan-
tive offense in Florida.z1 Thus, the court found that to be consistent with
Rodriguez, "precedent ... require[d] that the elements of the felony petit
larceny statute be alleged in the charging document."'2 In the short term,
Young will no doubt lead to reversals in those cases where the state made
no attempt at all to initially charge the elements of felony petit theft.23
Even in the long run, Young, unfortunately, may not have provided as many
answers as one would expect and desire. First, the court did not explicitly
require that the state specifically allege the date and place of an accused's
prior theft convictions. However, the opinion implies this is necessary. 4
Second, the court did not address whether Young also applies to those cases
15. Compare State v. Crocker, 519 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (not
requiring such allegations of prior convictions) with Clay v. State, 595 So. 2d 1052, 1053
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding such allegations required based on Rodriguez).
16. 641 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1994).
17. Id. at 402.
18. Id. Young received the ten-year sentence as a habitual offender. Id.
19. Young v. State, 630 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted,
634 So. 2d 629 (Fla.), and quashed by 641 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1994).
20. Young, 641 So. 2d at 403.
21. Id. at 402. E.g., State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1978).
22. Young, 641 So. 2d at 403.
23. E.g., Gallon v. State, 648 So. 2d 309, 309 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing
a felony petit theft conviction where the elements of this offense were not specifically
charged).
24. The Young decision requires the state to "include language to the effect that..
[should] the defendant [be convicted] ... of petit theft, the defendant is also charged with
felony petit theft under section 812.014(2)(d) by reason of the previous convictions of two
or more thefts as thereafter described." 641 So. 2d at 403 n.4. (emphasis added).
This language appears to demand three things in a charging document alleging felony
petit theft: 1) notice of the state's intent to increase any petit theft conviction; 2) an express
citation to the subsection allowing such increase; and 3) descriptions of the prior convictions
that will be relied upon to increase the offense.
19951
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where the state wishes to increase a petit theft conviction from a second-
degree misdemeanor, to a first-degree misdemeanor due to the accused
already having one theft conviction. Finally, the requirement in Young will
be easy to satisfy where only petit theft offenses are being charged but what
about those cases where grand theft or some other offense is involved?
When the state wishes to retain the possibility of convicting a defendant of
felony petit theft if the accused is found guilty of petit theft as a lesser
included offense, must it charge in the alternative to satisfy Young?
25
Young does provide the answer to one situation which has concerned
the courts. The state will not have to prove the existence of the prior
convictions during a trial itself. Young recognized that allowing such a
procedure would present a high likelihood of unfairly prejudicing an
accused. Instead, even in a jury trial, the state must prove the existence of
the accused's previous theft convictions in a separate post-trial hearing
before the trial court.2 6 Indeed, in a jury trial all possible steps must be
taken to keep the previous theft convictions from the jury, so that the
accused's presumption of innocence is preserved. 7
25. Two cases illustrate that this scenario is possible and the barrier Young may raise
to securing felony petit theft convictions. In Crocker, 519 So. 2d at 33, the accused was
charged with resisting an officer with violence and grand theft. Crocker was convicted of
the resisting charge and of petit theft. The district court of appeal held the petit theft
conviction could be reclassified to felony petit theft despite the State's failure to allege the
prior theft convictions. Id. at 33-34. The court reasoned that otherwise "the state would
have to charge ... felony petit theft, in the alternative, in every case that a jury could find
the defendant guilty of petit theft as a lesser included offense of the crime actually charged."
Id. at 33.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected Crocker in Young. 641 So. 2d at 403.
Even when theft charges are not initially involved, Young may cause later problems. Theft
is considered a lesser included offense of robbery. Thus, when robbery is charged, the state
sometimes does not separately allege a theft. However, if an accused is acquitted of robbery
and merely found guilty of petit theft, no enhancement would be possible unless the state
alternatively alleged first-degree misdemeanor or felony petit theft.
26. The court noted with approval that such a process was mandated in Rodriguez,
which itself cited with approval the court's earlier decision in Harris, on this point.
Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1264-65. Both Harris and Rodriguez were once again approved
in Young. 641 So. 2d at 402-03.
27. Thus, if a charging document is allowed into the jury room, all mention of a
felony petit theft charge and of the prior convictions must be excised from it. Young, 641
So. 2d at 403 n.4.
Although Young does not explicitly say so, its decision suggests that where prior theft
convictions are the sole basis for increasing a theft charge, neither the court nor the
prosecutor should refer to the charge as "felony petit theft" in the jury's presence.
Vol. 20
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B. Robbery
Robbery at common law was a combination of two other common law
offenses: larceny and assault. The distinguishing feature between a larceny
and a robbery was force. Larceny was a theft accomplished without force,
while robbery was a theft accomplished by force or the threat of force. The
Florida statutory codifications of these two offenses have retained this
common law distinction.28 Under present Florida law, a mere wrongful
taking cannot be a robbery. The present definition of robbery contains two
act requirements: 1) there must be a taking of another's property from that
person's custody, and 2) during this taking there must be "the use of force,
violence, assault, or putting in fear."29 Prior to 1987, a series of Florida
cases reversed robbery convictions based upon the conclusion that while the
defendant used force, this force was not used to gain possession of the
property involved so only a theft had occurred. Florida courts consistent-
ly found that use of force in an escape, or an attempt to escape after a
wrongful taking, did not make the taking a robbery.3 In so doing, the
courts rejected the argument that former Florida Statutes section 812.13(3),
now section 812.13(3)(a), broadened the definition of robbery in section
812.13(1).32 The 1987 Florida Legislature remedied this situation by
28. Since the Florida statutory definition only requires that an assault, and not an
actual battery accompany the taking, a defendant can be convicted of both robbery and
battery for the same incident in Florida without creating double jeopardy problems. FLA.
STAT. § 812.13(1). For a recent case holding that such multiple convictions are possible, see
Hamrick v. State, 648 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
29. FLA. STAT. § 812.13(1).
30. E.g., Royal v. State, 490 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1986). The Royal court found that
defendants, who pushed aside a store detective and then pointed a gun at another employee
during their escape, could not be convicted of robbery since they had already obtained
wrongful possession of the goods involved before these acts occurred. Id. at 45-46. The
court held that the statutorily required "'force, violence, assault, or putting in fear' must
occur prior to or contemporaneous with the taking of property." Id. at 45. -
31. E.g., Milam v. State, 505 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that force used in an attempted escape from a store after goods have been taken came too
late to make the crime a robbery). See also Walker v. State, 493 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the act of violence outside of the store following actual
theft did not support a robbery charge).
32. Royal, 490 So. 2d at 46 (citing FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(a) (1983)). Florida
Statutes section 812.13(3)(a) states that "[a]n act shall be deemed 'in the course of
committing the robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the
attempt or commission." FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3) (1983). Rather than broadening the
definition of robbery in section 812.13(1), the Supreme Court of Florida found that section
812.13(3) was only intended to broaden the scope of robbery for purposes of deciding the
degree involved under section 812.13(2). Royal, 490 So. 2d at 46.
1995]
7
Dobson: Criminal Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
passing section 812.13(3)(b) which broadened the traditional scope of a
common law taking to include an act occurring after the taking "if it and the
act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events. 33  Under
such language, force used immediately after a wrongful taking occurs
appears to be sufficient to convert the theft into a robbery.34
Jones v. State35 recently settled any question about the sufficiency of
this language to produce such a result. There, among other issues raised
about his convictions and sentences, the defendant claimed that the force
involved was not sufficient to sustain his two convictions for armed robbery.
The jury had found Jones guilty of the first-degree murders and armed
robberies of his former employer and the employer's wife. Both victims
were found stabbed to death in their place of business, where Jones was
found suffering from a bullet wound. Besides Jones there was no eye-
witness to the homicides. From the evidence it appeared that one victim
had been stabbed from behind and that the second victim had been stabbed
in the chest. Jones claimed that he should have been acquitted of the two
armed robbery charges since the victims never perceived the use of force or
violence in connection with the taking of their property. Jones further
contended that the evidence was only sufficient to establish a "posthumous
theft" rather than a robbery as both victims could have been dead at the time
he actually took their property. In an important decision, the Supreme Court
of Florida rejected both arguments and affirmed Jones' armed robbery
convictions.36
The court first focused on the language in section 812.13(3)(b),
defining what constitutes "in the course of the taking" for purposes of a
33. FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (1987).
34. E.g., Santilli v. State, 570 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that a defendant who shoplifted from a store and then tried to hit the store's security guard
with his car when confronted about the theft used force "in the course of taking" and thus
committed robbery). Santilli rejected the argument that as long as the accused does not
abandon the stolen property, there will always be a sufficient nexus between the wrongful
taking and later force to convert the theft into a robbery. Id. at 401-02. Instead, the court
suggested that an examination be made of the time and space between the theft and the use
of force. Id.
If a defendant abandons the stolen property and only then tries to use some force or
threat to escape, some courts have held that there is not "a continuous series of acts or
events" between the taking and the force or threat to constitute a robbery. E.g., Garcia v.
State, 614 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
35. 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 202 (1995).
36. Id. at 353.
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robbery. According to the court, this language meant that a "taking of
property that otherwise would be considered a theft constitutes robbery,
37
when the necessary element of force is present. This force or violence
element under the added statutory language could occur before, contempo-
raneously with, or even after the taking of the property, "so long as both the
act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series
of acts or events. 38
The court also rejected the argument that a victim has to know that
force or violence is being used upon the victim's person in order for there
to be a robbery.39 Looking at the statute's plain language, the court found
that the basic definition in section 812.13(1) only requires the use of force
during the taking and does not require that the victim be aware of the use
of force.40  As the court stated, "where the defendant employs force or
violence that renders the victim unaware of the taking, the force or violence
component of the robbery statute is satisfied."'" Thus, even if the two
victims here were unaware that Jones was attacking them to take their
property, the force element needed for robbery was met. The court found
that the murders and the taking of the property were clearly part of one
continuous series of events and thus the accused had been properly
convicted of robbery.42
C. Sexual Offenses Involving Children
The Supreme Court of Florida handed down four important decisions
concerning sexual offenses involving children in the past year. Two of
these decisions concerned constitutional challenges to sections of the Florida
Statutes, while the two other decisions involved issues of statutory
37. Id. at 349.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jones, 652 So. 2d at 349.
41. Id at 350.
42. Id. Jones also argued that he had been improperly convicted of one of the
robberies because there was no evidence the property involved in that crime had been "'taken
from ... [the victim's] person or from ... [the victim's] immediate custody or control."'
Id. The court rejected the argument that the property taken must be on the victim's person
or in the victim's presence. Id. If the property was "sufficiently under the victim's control
so that the victim could have prevented the taking if... not ... subjected to violence or
intimidation by the robber," then the requirement in § 812.13(1) that the property be taken
"'from the person or custody of another"' is met. Jones, 652 So. 2d at 350.
1995]
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construction. The latter two decisions are discussed below, while the others
are discussed later in this survey.43
The two decisions that did not involve constitutional challenges both
involved questions concerning former Florida Statutes section 794.041,
which relates to "[s]exual activity with child by or at solicitation of person
in familial or custodial authority; penalties. 4 Both decisions were handed
down on the same date. One decision, Thompson v. State,4 5 addressed the
issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of both sexual activity
while in custodial authority of a child and of sexual battery on a physically
incapacitated victim46 based on evidence of a single sexual act. Thompson
had been convicted of both offenses and sentenced to two concurrent nine-
year terms based on a single sexual act. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed these convictions but noted possible conflict with other district
courts of appeal's decisions. 47 In a short opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida reversed a finding that the prohibition against multiple punishments
had been violated.48 In earlier decisions, the court had found "multiple
punishments impermissible [when] based on a single act if the various
offenses are distinguished only by degree elements. '49  The court found,
43. See discussion infra part III.B. for the two cases involving the constitutional
challenges.
44. The Florida Legislature repealed this section in 1993. Ch. 93-156, § 4, 1993 Fla.
Laws 907, 911. However, the provisions of this former section were replaced by present
section 794.011(8)(a)-(b). FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994).
45. 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994).
46. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (4)(0. Unlike § 794.041, this section has not been amended
or repealed.
47. Thompson v. State, 627 So. 2d 74, 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed by
650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994). The court noted possible conflict with the decision in George
v. State, 488 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding only one sexual battery
conviction was proper once the evidence established only one unlawful penetration).
Thompson, 627 So. 2d at 74.
48. Thompson, 650 So. 2d at 969.
49. Id. The supreme court relied on its decisions in Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 1994) and Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1994), for its decision in Thompson.
Id. In Sirmons, the court held that an accused could not be convicted of both grand theft
auto and robbery with a weapon based on a single taking of an automobile at knifepoint.
634 So. 2d at 154. The court found that only one base offense, theft, was factually involved
and that both charges were merely varying degrees of this base offense. Id. In Goodwin,
the court relied on Sirmons to find that convictions for both vehicular manslaughter and for
unlawful blood alcohol level ("UBAL") manslaughter, stemming from one death, was not
permissible. 634 So. 2d at 157.
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without discussion, that such was clearly the case here.' Thus, two
convictions and punishments, even when they were to run concurrently,
were not permissible.5
The second case provided a much more intensive and important
discussion of Florida Statutes section 794.041. In Hallberg v. State,"2 the
Supreme Court of Florida decided what it means for a person to be "in a
position of ... custodial authority."53 Hallberg had been convicted of five
counts of lewd acts upon a child and three counts of engaging a child in
sexual activities by a person in a position of familial or custodial authority.
For each of the lewd acts he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and
for each of the sexual activities by a custodial authority, he received twenty-
seven years imprisonment. All sentences were to run concurrently.
Hallberg appealed his convictions of sexual activity by a person in a
position of familial or custodial authority contending that he did not stand
in such a relationship to the victim here. Hallberg was clearly not a parent
or other relative of the victim, thus the State conceded that he could not be
in a position of "familial" authority. The question remained whether he
could be in a position of "custodial" authority at the time of the sexual
activity involved.
Hallberg was employed as a junior high school teacher, and his victim
was enrolled in one of his honors classes during her eighth grade year.
Following the eighth grade year, the victim planned to take another honors
class with Hallberg the next year. During the summer recess, Hallberg went
to the victim's home where he committed the sexual acts involved. This
particular visit to the victim's home occurred at a time when Hallberg had
no teaching or other supervisory responsibility over the student-victim. As
the court noted in its opinion, "[iut is undisputed that these events did not
occur during the school year and that they did not occur in connection with
Hallberg's assigned teaching responsibilities or a recognized extracurricular
event. 54  The State still raised three arguments to support Hallberg's
50. Although the opinion does not state such, the supreme court must have found that
both convictions were merely aggravated forms of one base offense, sexual battery.
51. Both Sirmons and Goodwin had cited FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2) in
concluding that the dual convictions were impermissible in those cases. Sirmons, 634 So. 2d
at 153-54; Goodwin, 634 So. 2d at 157. In Thompson, the court did not cite the present
version of § 775.021, but instead cited directly to article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitu-
tion. 650 So. 2d at 969.
52. 649 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1994).
53. Id. at 1355 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.041(2) (1987)). Similar language is now
found in FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8).
54. Id. at 1356.
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convictions. First, the State argued that as a teacher, Hallberg always stood
in a position of in loco parentis over his students and thus was legally
responsible for their welfare. Secondly, the State contended that the
victim's parents consented to Hallberg's visit and thus vested him during
that time with custodial authority over her. Finally, the state argued that the
close relationship between Hallberg and the victim placed him in a custodial
status over her. The court rejected these arguments and found that "teachers
are not, by reason of their chosen profession, custodians of their students at
all times, particularly when school is recessed for the summer., 55 Instead,
the court agreed with the analysis set forth in Judge Altenbernd's dissent to
the Second District Court of Appeal's affirmance of Hallberg's convictions.
Judge Altenbemd, after first noting the events did not occur during the
school year or on school property, nor in connection with any sort of school
extracurricular activity, noted that the victim's parents, while aware that the
defendant wanted the victim to help him prepare for an upcoming class over
the summer, did not consent to his visits to their home, nor did they have
knowledge of such. Judge Altenbernd turned to the dictionary definition of
custodian. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary, the
definition of "custodian" was "someone who has custody of another,,
56
custody implies a duty or obligation to care for the other person. As there
was no school activity going on and the victim's parents had not placed the
defendant in a custodial authority over her, Judge Altenbemd believed this
was not satisfied. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with this reasoning
finding that "the term 'custodial,' absent a statutory definition, must be
construed in accordance with the commonly understood definition as one
having custody and control of another."57 The court found that if the
state's broad definition of custody were agreed to, it would be possible that
an accused might not even know that he had custody over a child when
engaging the child in sexual activity.58 Based upon the rule of leniency
that a criminal statute should be construed most favorably to the accused,
55. Id. at 1357.
56. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 559 (1986) (quoted in
Hallberg v. State, 621 So. 2d 693, 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Altenbernd, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1357).
57. Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1358.
58. Id.
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the court found that such a broad construction should be rejected and a
narrower one as urged by Judge Altenbernd accepted.59
Justice Shaw, in an extensive dissent, argued that the court's definition
ignored the plain language of section 794.041.' Justice Shaw focused on
the language in section 794.041(2) stating, any person "who stands in a
position of [familial or] custodial authority.' In his view, a teacher
stands in the position of custodial authority over a student at all times, even
during the summer.6' Thus, in Justice Shaw's view, one need not have
actual custodial authority over a child victim as long as one stands in such
a potential position. Since teachers hold the power position over their
students, he believed that this was enough to violate section 794.01 and
would have affirmed Hallberg's conviction.63 Indeed, in this particular
case, Justice Shaw found that a direct connection between the accused's
position as a teacher and the victim's position as a student led to the victim
giving in to the teacher's sexual demands, thus, in his view, violating
section 791.041. 64
The Florida Legislature repealed Florida Statutes section 794.041, the
main section discussed in both these cases, in 1993.65 However, in so
doing, the legislature added a new subsection, section 794.011(8), to section
794.011, which discusses sexual battery.66 Sexual battery by a person in
a position of familial or custodial authority has thus even more clearly been
made a degree of the basic offense of sexual battery. This would seem to
show legislative agreement with the decision in Thompson and demonstrate
that decision's continued applicability. The supreme court's decision in
Hallberg will be of even more importance. Various subsections of Florida
Statutes section 794.011(8) make it a third, first, or life felony, for a "person
who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to a person less than
18 years of age"67 to solicit or actually commit a sexual battery on a
minor. Like former section 794.041, section 794.011(8) does not define "in
59. Thus, Hallberg's three convictions for sexual activity with a child by a person in
custodial authority were reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. Id. The
obvious practical result for Hallberg will be a resentencing where he will most likely receive
a substantially shorter sentence.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.041(2) (1987)) (emphasis omitted).
62. Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1360-61.
63. Id. at 1358.
64. Id.
65. Ch. 93-156, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 907, 911.
66. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8).
67. Id.
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a position of familial or custodial authority." Thus, Hallberg will be looked
to for guidance and authority on this subject.
D. Leaving an Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
This year, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down an important
decision regarding Florida Statutes section 316.027, which discusses
accidents involving death or personal injuries. In State v. Mancuso,6"
Dennis Mancuso was charged with leaving the scene of an accident
involving death or personal injury under section 316.027 of the Florida
Statutes.69 Mancuso had allegedly struck two pedestrians in the early
morning hours of December 6, 1992. Later that day, he went to the local
police department and reported his car had been involved in an accident.
Mancuso claimed he did not know his vehicle had hit anything or anyone.
Instead, he told the police that his windshield had suddenly cracked while
he was driving but that no debris or other signs of an accident were visible
when he pulled over to inspect the damage to his car. Mancuso eventually
left his car near the scene and walked home. One of the victims died and
the other was seriously injured. Therefore, the State criminally charged
Mancuso for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal
injury.
At trial, Mancuso requested that the jury be instructed that the State
must prove he knew he was involved in an accident resulting in personal
injury to another and then willfully left the scene and willfully failed to aid
68. 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995).
69. Id. Florida Statutes section 316.027(1)(a) states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of
any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or
as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to, and in every event
shall remain at the scene of, the accident, until he has fulfilled the requirements
of s. 316.062.
FLA. STAT. § 316.027(1)(a) (1991).
Subsection (2) provided that any person willfully failing to comply with the require-
ments of subsection (1) was guilty of a third-degree felony. Id. § 316.027(2). Florida
Statutes section 316.062 requires a driver involved in an accident to stop and exchange
certain information and to render aid to persons injured in the accident. FLA. STAT. §
316.062 (Supp. 1994). Florida Statutes section 316.027 was amended in 1993. Ch. 93-140,
§ 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 805, 806. However, the only major change was to make leaving the
scene of an accident involving death a second-degree felony. FLA. STAT. § 316.027(1)
(1993). Willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury but not death
remains a second-degree felony. FLA. STAT. § 316.027(2) (Supp. 1994).
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the victims.7" The trial court denied this instruction and instead gave an
instruction that omitted any requirement concerning knowledge of the injury.
The jurors were told that they only had to find Mancuso was involved in an
accident resulting in death or injury, that he knew or should have known
that he was involved in an accident, and that he willfully failed to stop at
the accident scene. Mancuso was convicted of violating section 316.027 and
appealed his conviction.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Mancuso's conviction,
because the jury instructions did not contain any instruction on "constructive
knowledge" of the death or injury of the victims. 71 The State contended
the jurors were properly instructed as they only needed to determine that
Mancuso knew, or should have known, that he was involved in an accident
and that an injury or death had resulted therefrom. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal briefly examined cases from other jurisdictions agreeing
with the State's argument that knowledge of the injury is not a separate
element which the jury must be instructed upon. The court noted that those
decisions involved the interpretation of statutory language significantly
different from Florida's. Specifically, the court noted that Florida Statutes
section 316.027 contains a "willfulness" requirement that these other states'
laws did not.72 Thus, the other states' laws were "strict liability laws"
while Florida's was not. Although it found that Mancuso's conviction
should be reversed, the district court of appeal certified this issue to the
Supreme Court of Florida as one involving a question of great public
importance.73
70. The exact instruction Mancuso requested was as follows:
3. That Dennis Mancuso knew that he was involved in an accident which
resulted in personal injury to another;
4. That Dennis Mancuso, knowing he was in an accident which resulted in
personal injury to another:
a. Willfully left the scene; and/or
b. Willfully failed to give... [certain information to the others] involved
in the accident ... or to a police officer at the scene....
c. Willfully failed to render aid to any injured person at the scene.
Mancuso v. State, 636 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 652 So. 2d 370
(Fla. 1995). "'Willfully' is defined to mean that Dennis Mancuso intended to leave the scene
of an accident knowing it resulted in personal injury to another." Id.
71. Id at 754. In so doing, the district court of appeal found that neither the
defendant's requested instruction, nor the one the trial court gave, was correct.
72. Id at 756.
73. The exact question certified was as follows: "IN A PROSECUTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), MUST THE STATE
SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE
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In a short, but instructive opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the district court's decision.74 The supreme court first noted that
section 316.027 was modeled after the Uniform Vehicle Law." The court
also noted that previous Florida decisions construing the section's "willful-
ness" requirement have held that knowledge of the accident is an essential
element under section 316.027.76 The question presented to the court in
this case was whether knowledge of the injury, in addition to knowledge of
the accident, was a separate essential element of section 316.027." Since
there were no previous Florida decisions on this point, and the court was
dealing with a statute modeled after a uniform law, the court looked to deci-
sions in other jurisdictions construing statutes modeled after the same law.
In so doing, the court found that most of these decisions had found either
that "actual or constructive knowledge of injury" 7 was necessary to make
a person criminally liable.
The court in Mancuso found two reasons for such an interpretation. 9
First, statutes criminalizing hit-and-runs from personal injury scenes
generally impose more severe criminal penalties than those involving hit-
and-run incidents involving only property damage. 0  Secondly, the
language of section 316.027 requires the driver to take affirmative action.8'
The court found that in fairness before one can be required to act in a
certain fashion, the driver must be aware of the facts which give rise to this
affirmative statutory duty. 2 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
"criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver
charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death
or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that
the jury should be so instructed.8 3
The Mancuso decision will have an impact in at least two ways. First,
and most importantly, whenever an accused is charged with the same
offense in the future, the jury will have to be instructed that knowledge of
the death and/or personal injury is required to convict. The supreme court
INJURY OR DEATH; AND THE JURY BE SO INSTRUCTED?" Id.
74. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 372.
75. Id. at 371.
76. Id. See Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980).
77. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 370-71.
78. Id. at 371.
79. Id. at 372.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 372.
83. Id.
Vol. 20
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/3
Dobson
did not specify what the exact language of such an instruction should be.
Instead, this matter was referred to the Supreme Court Committee on
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.84 Second, there will be some
reversals in other cases involving charges under section 316.027 where the
juries were not instructed about this knowledge requirement.8 5
84. Id In July 1995, the Committee forwarded the following proposed instruction
to the Supreme Court of Florida for its approval:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Leaving the scene of an
Accident, the state must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1. (Defendant) was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in [injury to] [death of] any person.
2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that [he] [she] was
involved in an accident.
3. (Defendant) knew or should have known of the [injury to] [death of]
the person.
4. (Defendant) willfully failed to stop at the scene of the accident or
as close to the accident as possible and remain there until [he] [she] had given
a. to the [injured person] [driver] [occupant] or [person attending the
vehicle] and
b. to any police officer at the scene of the accident or investigating the
accident the following information:
a. [sic] [his] [her] name,
b. [his] [her] address,
C. registration number of vehicle [he] [she] was driving, and license
plate number of vehicle [he] [she] was driving, and
d. if available, and requested, the exhibition of [his] [her] license or
permit to drive.
5. (Defendant) willfully failed to render reasonable assistance to the
injured person if such treatment appeared to be necessary or was requested by
the injured person.
"Reasonable assistance" includes carrying or making arrangements to carry
the injured person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical
treatment.
"Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly and purposely.
Telephone Conversation with chambers of the Hon. Fredricka Greene Smith, Circuit Court
Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida (Oct. 6, 1995). However, the court
returned the proposed instruction to the Committee for further study. As of October 6, 1995,
the Committee had not recommended another proposed instruction.
Judge Smith chaired the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in
Criminal Cases at the time of the supreme court's action.
85. See, e.g., Cordier v. State, 652 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Reeves
v. State, 647 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Both cases were decided during this
survey period. In both cases, the district courts reversed convictions under Florida Statutes
section 316.027, because the jury was not told that knowledge of the death or personal injury
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E. Manslaughter
Criminal homicide is a general offense often distinguished among its
various types and degrees by different gradations of intent. Thus, delineat-
ing when certain acts clearly constitute one type and degree of homicide
offense from another is sometimes difficult to do. One common definition
of manslaughter at common law declared that this offense existed when
there was an unlawful killing of one human being by another, without
malice aforethought, upon a sudden impulse or heat of passion, and without
any legal justification or excuse. The term "malice aforethought" was a
legal term of art used to recognize a number of different situations in which
a person would be guilty of murder. Absent one of these situations, an
unlawful killing would generally be considered a manslaughter.
Florida has retained this notion that manslaughter generally is a lesser
included offense of murder. The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized
that manslaughter "is a residual offense, defined by reference to what it is
not. 86 Thus, the supreme court has consistently required that when an
accused is charged with manslaughter or a greater homicide offense not
more than one step removed from manslaughter, the jury must also be
instructed on what constitutes a justifiable or excusable homicide under
Florida law.87 The need for such instruction on justifiable or excusable
was an essential element of the offense. Cordier, 652 So. 2d at 505; Reeves, 647 So. 2d at
995. In each case, the defendants had not objected to the failure of giving such an
instruction. However, both decisions found that this did not matter as the failure to instruct
a jury concerning an element of a crime charged constitutes fundamental and reversible error.
Cordier, 652 So. 2d at 505; Reeves, 647 So. 2d at 995.
86. Stockton v. State, 544 So. 2d 1006, 1007-08 (Fla. 1989). In this case, the trial
court correctly instructed a jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second and
third-degree murder. Id. at 1007. This original set of jury instructions also included
instructions about what would be considered justifiable or excusable homicide. However,
when the court reinstructed the jury, at its request, on second and third-degree murder, the
trial court on its own also decided to reinstruct on manslaughter but refused defense counsel's
request to reinstruct on excusable and/or justifiable homicide. The supreme court found this
refusal to be reversible, as "[a]n instruction on manslaughter which omits the definitions of
justifiable and excusable homicide is ... incomplete." Id. at 1008.
The court did indicate that if the trial court had limited the reinstruction to the jury's
specific requests and had not included its own reinstruction on manslaughter, there would
have been no error. Id.
87. See Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965). However, if defense counsel
specifically requests a limited form of the standard instruction on justifiable and excusable
homicide and the trial court gives the instruction requested, then the defense has waived its
claim to raise on appeal the argument that the instruction as given was erroneous. Armstrong
v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991). Likewise, it is not fundamental error for the court
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homicide is evident from the statutory definition of manslaughter.88 Des-
pite the supreme court's apparently clear mandate that a complete instruction
on manslaughter also requires an instruction as to what constitutes justifiable
and/or excusable homicide, Florida's trial courts continue to struggle with
this requirement.
The Florida trial courts' continued failure to adequately instruct juries
on manslaughter was recently demonstrated by the supreme court's decision
in State v. Lucas.89 There, David Lucas was charged with attempted
second-degree murder and various other offenses. At his trial, Lucas
admitted that the criminal acts had occurred but claimed that he was not the
perpetrator. Defense counsel requested, and the trial court gave an
instruction on attempted manslaughter as a category one lesser included
offense of attempted second-degree murder. Unfortunately, the trial court
failed to explain that Lucas could not be convicted of attempted manslaugh-
ter if the evidence showed that the attempted homicide was either justified
or excused. The defendant did not request such a charge and did not object
to the omission. After the jury found him guilty of all charges, Lucas
appealed his attempted second-degree murder conviction claiming that the
court's exclusion of justifiable and excusable homicide from its definition
of attempted manslaughter was fundamental error requiring reversal.
On appeal, the State claimed that the failure to give jury instructions
on the definition of justifiable and excusable homicide should not constitute
fundamental error which would be per se reversible. The First District
Court of Appeal agreed the defense at trial conceded that there was a
second-degree murder and only disputed identity.9" Thus, there really was
no factually contested issue regarding attempted manslaughter, justifiable
homicide, or excusable homicide. However, the district court found itself
bound by earlier supreme court decisions and reversed the attempted second-
to give a short-form instruction, instead of a long-form instruction, on excusable homicide
where there is no objection from the defense. State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 310 (Fla.
1990).
88. Florida Statutes section 782.07 states in part that:
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence
of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of chapter
776 and in cases in which such killings shall not be excusable homicide or
murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, shall be deemed manslaugh-
ter ....
FLA. STAT. § 782.07.
89. 645 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1994).
90. Lucas v. State, 630 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 645 So.
2d 425 (Fla. 1994).
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degree murder conviction anyway.9 The court certified this question to
the supreme court as one of great public importance.92
Despite the lack of evidence to support a finding of excusable and
justifiable homicide, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the failure to
give a complete instruction here constituted per se reversible error.93 In so
doing the court appears to hold fast to its bright-line rule regarding the
necessity of complete instructions when defining the crime of manslaughter
for a jury in Florida. The court held that "failure to give a complete initial
instruction on manslaughter constitutes fundamental reversible error when
the defendant is convicted of either manslaughter or a greater offense not
more than one step removed."94 The court found only one exception to
this requirement, that being the situation where defense counsel has
affirmatively agreed to, or even requested, the incomplete instruction.95
Lucas will hopefully bring an end to the problem of having homicide
cases reversed in Florida due to a trial court's failure to give complete
instructions on manslaughter. The moral of the Lucas decision for both
prosecutors and trial judges is simple. Whenever an accused is charged with
manslaughter or a homicide offense one step removed, the jury should
always be given correct instructions as to what constitutes justifiable and
91. Id. at 600-01.
92. Id. at 600. The question certified to and decided by the supreme court was as
follows:
WHEN A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF EITHER MAN-
SLAUGHTER OR A GREATER OFFENSE NOT MORE THAN ONE STEP
REMOVED, DOES FAILURE TO EXPLAIN JUSTIFIABLE AND EXCUS-
ABLE HOMICIDE AS PART OF THE MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
ALWAYS CONSTITUTE BOTH 'FUNDAMENTAL' AND PER SE REVERS-
IBLE ERROR, WHICH MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL AND MAY NOT BE SUBJECTED TO A HARMLESS-ERROR
ANALYSIS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE EVIDENCE COULD
SUPPORT A -FINDING OF EITHER JUSTIFIABLE OR EXCUSABLE
HOMICIDE?
Id.
93. Lucas, 645 So. 2d at 427.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court cited Armstrong, for approval of this exception. For a recent case
after Lucas applying this exception to affirm a second-degree murder conviction, even where
no instructions on excusable or justifiable homicide were given, see Abbarno v. State, 654
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Lucas did not indicate that the situation suggested in Stockton, where the jury requests
reinstruction on second or third-degree murder, and the judge only instructs on these
homicide offenses and not on manslaughter, would also be an exception to the general rule
in Lucas. Thus, the continued viability of Stockton is in doubt.
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excusable homicide in Florida, even when the evidence would not support
such a finding. Prosecutors who follow this simple rule should have no
difficulty living with the Lucas decision. If the evidence would definitely
not support a finding of justifiable or excusable homicide, the instruction
will just be superfluous and the jury will merely ignore it. Prosecutors and
trial judges will have to be careful of defense "sandbagging" after Lucas.
The lack of requested instructions or an objection to the lack of instructions
about excusable or justifiable homicide made no difference as to the
defense's ability to raise the issue on appeal. Thus, defense counsel will no
longer feel an urgency to request such instruction. Prosecutors will have to
remain constantly alert to make sure manslaughter instructions are appropri-
ately complete.
9 6
F. Felony Offense Reclassification
Substantive criminal law recognizes that offenses can be committed by
a variety of means. Some means used to commit a criminal offense actually
or potentially increase the harm, or threat of harm, stemming from the
offense committed. Sometimes the substantive criminal law explicitly takes
this into account. Thus, when a theft is committed by force or threat of
force, the offense becomes a robbery. Likewise, Florida substantive criminal
law has long distinguished among various degrees of batteries and assaults,
depending upon the means used to perpetrate the offense.97 However,
given the wide variety of crimes existing in Florida, explicitly providing for
changes in each individual offense's nature or degree whenever force or
threat of force is used would be practically impossible. Instead, to partially
alleviate the difficulty of providing a degree increase in each individual of-
96. The need to remain alert to make sure correct jury instructions are given exists
when the jury is reinstructed on a point as well as initially instructed about that matter. Even
if counsel points out that initial instructions are erroneous and the court attempts to cure this
deficiency, mistakes will sometimes occur.
For a recent case illustrating this point, see Cummings v. State, 648 So. 2d 166 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), where counsel drew the trial court's attention to a mistake made
in initially instructing the jury about excusable homicide and the trial court erred again, but
in a different way, when reinstructing the jurors about excusable homicide. The court noted
that the lack of evidence to support excusable homicide made no difference. Id. at 168.
97. Thus, simple assault becomes aggravated assault when a deadly weapon is used
without the intent to kill. FLA. STAT. § 784.021(l)(a). Likewise, simple battery becomes
aggravated battery when a deadly weapon is used. FLA. STAT. § 784.945(1)(a)(2).
Of course the change from an assault to a battery once actual force is used, as opposed
to threat of force, is another illustration of how substantive criminal law distinguishes
between kinds of offenses due to the harm that actual use of force causes or may cause.
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fense's sections, the legislature promulgated a general reclassification statute
for most felony offenses when a firearm or weapon is used to perpetrate
them.
Florida Statutes section 775.087(1) provides, in part that, when during
a felony an accused "carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any
weapon or firearm, or ... commits an aggravated battery""s the felony is
reclassified to the next highest degree. This reclassification section does not
apply to felony offenses where the use of a weapon or firearm is an
essential element of the crime that the defendant committed.99 Within the
survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two important cases
concerning the construction of section 775.087(1).
The first case, State v. Tripp,"°° involved the certified question of
whether an accused's conviction may be reclassified under section
775.087(1) without the jury explicitly finding that the defendant had a
weapon during the commission of the felony involved.1"' Tripp had
entered a convenience store and had repeatedly struck the store clerk with
a claw hammer. After he was unsuccessful in opening the cash register, he
again beat the clerk with the hammer, causing her serious physical injuries.
Tripp was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, robbery
with a deadly weapon, and attempted first-degree murder. The charging
document specifically alleged that he had a premeditated design to cause the
98. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(1).
99. For a recent Florida case finding upward reclassification of a felony impermissible
under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1), see McNeal v. State, 653 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The McNeal court found that an accused's attempted aggravated
battery conviction could not be reclassified from a third-degree to a second-degree felony
when the charging document had alleged that the aggravated battery was committed by use
of a deadly weapon. Id. at 1123. The court acknowledged that use of a deadly weapon was
not "an essential element of the offense of aggravated battery in all cases." Id. at 1123
(quoting Brown v. State, 583 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991)). However, the
McNeal court found that weapon's use became an essential element of the offense due to the
charging document's language. Id. at 1124.
100. 642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994).
101. Id. at 729. The certified question the supreme court considered was as follows:
"MAY A TRIAL COURT RECLASSIFY A FELONY CONVICTION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 775.087(1) ABSENT A SPECIFIC FINDING ON THE JURY'S VERDICT
FORM THAT A DEFENDANT CARRIED, DISPLAYED, USED, ETC. ANY WEAPON
OR FIREARM OR THAT HE COMMITTED AN AGGRAVATED BATTERY DURING
THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY SUBJECT TO RECLASSIFICATION?" Id. This
certified question was a rephrased version from the one originally certified by the district
court of appeal. Tripp v. State, 610 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), af'd,
642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994).
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victim's death while involved in a felony, namely the robbery, and did so
by attempting to murder her by hitting her in the head with a weapon, the
claw hammer. The jury found Tripp guilty of these three offenses.
Following his conviction, the State successfully sought to have his offenses
reclassified pursuant to section 775.087(1)."°
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the reclassification of
Tripp's first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery convictions. 3
The attempted armed robbery conviction reclassification was reversed,
because use of a weapon is an essential element in this offense."° As for
the attempted first-degree murder charge, the district court agreed with the
State's argument that use of the weapon was not an essential element of this
offense, thus the offense could be subject to reclassification. 5 The court
found that the charging document and the proof at trial supported the
determination that both a weapon had been used and an aggravated battery
had been committed during the attempted first-degree murder offense.' °6
However, the court noted that the verdict form contained no specific jury
finding that Tripp had used a deadly weapon or committed an aggravated
battery while committing the attempted first-degree murder. 7 Without
this explicit jury finding, the district court found that reclassification of the
attempted first-degree murder conviction from a first-degree felony to a life
felony was improper.'0 8
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but important opinion,
affirmed the First District Court of Appeal's decision."°  The supreme
court noted that the jury had found Tripp guilty of "charges made against
him in the Information"" and that the information had alleged Tripp used
a weapon when committing the attempted first-degree murder. However, the
supreme court found that "the jury did not make a sufficient finding that
Tripp used a weapon because there was no special verdict form reflecting
102. This reclassification resulted in the attempted first-degree murder being raised
to a life felony, instead of a first-degree felony.
103. Tripp, 610 So. 2d at 1313.
104. Id. at 1312.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tripp, 610 So. 2d at 1313.
109. Tripp, 642 So. 2d at 730.
110. Id. The supreme court quotes this language in its opinion. However, it is not
clear where the wording came from. As this wording does not appear in the First District
Court of Appeal opinion, this author assumes that it came from the jury verdict form.
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a separate finding to this effect.""' Since the court considered this
question a factual one for the jury, and not for the court to decide, without
such a special verdict form, reclassification was improper. Thus, Tripp
could only be sentenced for a first-degree felony, not a life felony.
Both the district court and the supreme court relied upon, and noted
with approval, the supreme court's earlier decision in State v. Overfelt, 12
also involving the proper construction of section 775.087. There, the
question was whether there had to be a jury finding that an accused
possessed a firearm before the trial court could reclassify a felony pursuant
to section 775.087(1)."' As with Tripp, the supreme court had found that
this was a factual finding for the jury and not for a trial court.'"' After
Tripp and Overfelt, prosecutors who plan to ask for reclassification of a
felony conviction pursuant to section 775.087(1) must make sure that the
jury receives special verdict forms or else reclassification will not be
possible. Given the Tripp and Overfelt decisions, all three factors which can
enhance a felony reclassification must be submitted to a jury for a specific
determination of their presence.!1 5
Despite the broad holding in Tripp, that whether a defendant used a
weapon during the commission of a felony is a jury question, a second
recent Supreme Court of Florida case construing section 775.087(1) shows
that there are some limits on this decision's scope. In State v. Houck,' 6
the defendant was accused of banging the victim's head against the
pavement, thus causing him serious head injuries which resulted in his
death. The State charged the defendant with second-degree murder alleging
that the pavement had been used as a weapon to injure the victim's head.
The jury instead found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a weapon.
The State sought reclassification under section 775.087(1), and the trial court
adjudicated Houck guilty of a first-degree felony. Unlike Tripp and
Overfelt, the jury had apparently been explicitly presented with the specific
question whether a weapon was used during the commission of the
111. Id.
112. 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1984).
113. Id. at 1386.
114. Id. at 1387.
115. Although the charge in Tripp only alleges the presence of one of the sentencing
enhancing factors of Florida Statutes section 775.087(1), the certified question the supreme
court answered included all three factors.
116. 652 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1995).
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felony.' 7 Thus, if this were purely a jury question as a broad reading of
these two cases implies, Houck's conviction and reclassification should have
been affirmed. However, that was not the case.
One difficulty with section 775.087(1) is that neither it, nor any section
of chapter 775, defines what should be considered a "weapon" for felony
reclassification purposes. This problem is not unique to this particular
statute. Other sections of the Florida Criminal Code using the term
"weapon" also lack a specific definition for it. Given the absence of a
statutory definition of "weapon" in chapter 775 the supreme court had two
apparent choices: adopt the definition of weapon found in chapter 790 as
had been done in other cases," 8 or give the word "weapon" its common
or ordinary meaning. In this case, both the supreme court and the district
court of appeal chose to resort to dictionary definitions for the meaning of
"weapon."... 9 Something would be considered a weapon if it is commonly
used as an "instrument for combat against another person."' 20 Pavements
are not such instruments. The supreme court rejected the State's argument
that whether something was a weapon was a matter for the jury and not for
117. Neither the district court of appeal's decision nor the supreme court's decision
say that the jury was presented with this question via a special jury form. The author infers
that this was the situation from the supreme court's opinion which does not mention Tripp.
The court's failure to cite Tripp, decided the same day as Houck, indicates that the error
which caused reversal there was probably not present in Houck. Whether this deduction is
correct or not, there would still be the same result in Houck, given the supreme court's
reasoning for the reversal there.
118. E.g., Arroyo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding it appropriate to use definitions in chapter 790 to determine what is a "dangerous
weapon" for purposes of deciding if an armed burglary has occurred under Florida Statutes
section 810.02(2)(b)); Gust v. State, 558 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding it appropriate to look to the definition in chapter 790 of "weapon" to determine
when a person commits armed robbery, a first-degree felony, rather than unarmed robbery,
a second-degree felony).
In Houck, both the district court and the supreme court used means other than looking
to chapter 790 for help in deciding what should be considered a weapon under Florida
Statutes section 775.087(1). Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360; Houck v. State, 634 So. 2d 180, 182
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 642 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1994). The district court of
appeal's decision indicated that even if the definition of "weapon" in section 709.001(13) had
been used, there would still have been a reversal of the felony reclassification. Houck, 634
So. 2d at 182.
119. The district court used the definition of weapon from Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary. Houck, 634 So. 2d at 182. However, the supreme court chose the definition in
the American Heritage College Dictionary. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360.
120. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360.
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the court.' The court found that allowing something as passive as a
pavement to be considered a weapon for sentencing enhancement would
allow all sorts of objects not otherwise considered inherently dangerous to
enhance convictions."22 Secondly, both the supreme court and the district
court of appeal recognized that allowing such a broad definition of weapon
might implicitly go against one of the purposes of the felony reclassification
statute.123 Both courts agreed that "the obvious legislative intent reflected
by 775.087 is to provide harsher punishment for, and hopefully deter, those
persons who use instruments commonly recognized as having the purpose
to inflict death and serious bodily injury upon other persons.' 24  If
virtually anything could be considered a "weapon" under this section, the
deterrence value of such a classification scheme would be lowered, as most
felonies would automatically be subject to reclassification."
Is Houck in conflict with Tripp and Overfelt? If Tripp is read broadly,
conflict between the two supreme court decisions is inevitable. However,
another reading of Tripp shows that no conflict exists. Under Houck
whether something can be considered a weapon, as a matter of law, remains
for the court to decide. However, under Tripp and Overfelt, whether
something can be legally considered a weapon for purposes of section
775.087(1) when used during the commission of a felony is a factual matter
for jury consideration. Read this way, there is no conflict between the two
decisions. 26
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184.
124. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360 (quoting Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184).
125. If the State's argument had been accepted, the deterrence value of Florida
Statutes section 775.087(1) would be lowered in another way. Deterrence assumes that
persons to be deterred have some knowledge or likelihood of knowledge of what it is they
are hopefully being deterred from doing. If "weapon" is given its common meaning, then
an ordinary person knows what he is being deterred from using. If what is a "weapon" is
left totally and completely up to a jury, an ordinary citizen can never know when harsher
punishment is likely.
126. The supreme court would obviously not want to render conflicting decisions
construing the same statute. When one remembers this fact, plus the fact that the decisions
were rendered the same day, this strongly suggests that there is no conflict between the two
opinions. Furthermore, Houck may not really have as broad an effect on the state's ability
to enhance felony convictions as one would expect. The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted
that the state had passed up another way to possibly have Houck's conviction reclassified
under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1). Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184. The court noted that
the state might have been able to prove Houck committed an aggravated battery during the
homicide. Id. at 183. The Fifth District Court of Appeal implies that this would have been
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G. Attempted Felony Murder
Perhaps no part of homicide law has generated more controversy than
the felony murder doctrine. The doctrine is based upon the belief that when
a defendant commits or attempts to commit a felony during or immediately
after which a homicide occurs, the felon should also be held liable for the
homicide as well as the underlying felony. The purpose of the felony
murder doctrine is twofold: 1) to deter potential felons from committing the
underlying felony in the first place; and 2) to urge felons who commit
felonies to commit them in the least dangerous fashion. In Florida, a felony
murder will be either first, second, or third-degree murder depending upon
the underlying felony 27 and upon who the person is who actually does the
killing.' The intent necessary for the killing is supplied through the legal
fiction of the homicide occurring during the course of the underlying felony.
Twice within the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court of Florida has
affirmed the notion that there is a crime of attempted felony murder. In
Fleming v. State,129 the court upheld the validity of the accused's guilty
plea to attempted first-degree felony murder for the shooting of a police
officer. The defendant had asserted that there could be no factual basis for
his plea because the officer was accidentally shot during a struggle for the
defendant's gun. The supreme court rejected that notion finding that the
inchoate crime of attempt consists of two essential elements: "(1) a specific
intent to commit the crime, and (2) a separate overt, ineffectual act done
toward its commission."' 30 Although the first requirement would seem to
have required the specific intent for a death to result, the Fleming court
a proper basis for reclassification. Id. The supreme court's opinion does not discuss this
suggestion. One issue arising under the district court's suggestion is whether aggravated
battery would be considered a lesser included offense of manslaughter, and if so, would
enhancement still be possible under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1) or would double
jeopardy prohibit this?
127. When the homicide is committed by someone perpetrating or attempting any one
of thirteen statutorily enumerated felonies, then a first-degree felony murder has been
committed. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (1994). When the homicide is committed by
someone perpetrating or attempting any felony other than one of the thirteen statutorily
enumerated felonies, then the homicide is a third-degree felony murder. Id. § 782.04(4).
128. When someone other than a person engaged in perpetrating or attempting one
of thirteen statutorily enumerated felonies actually commits the homicide, the felony murder
is a second-degree felony. Id. § 782.04(3).
129. 374 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1979).
130. Id. at 955 (citing Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grouneau v. State,
201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967)).
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noted that under the felony murder doctrine, unlike in other homicide
offenses, "[s]tate of mind is immaterial for the felony is said to supply the
intent."'' The Fleming court held that there is such a crime as attempted
felony murder in Florida based upon the finding that "where the alleged
"attempt' occurs during the commission of a felony ... the law presumes
the existence of premeditation, just as it does under the felony murder
rule."'
' 32
Five years after Fleming, in Amlotte v. State,133 the Supreme Court
of Florida reaffirmed that there is such a crime as attempted felony murder
in Florida.134 Relying in part on its decision in Fleming, the Amlotte court
described the essential elements of attempted felony murder as: 1) attempt
to perpetrate an enumerated felony; and 2) an intentional overt act, or the
aiding or abetting of such an act, which could, but does not cause the death
of another.135 Under the Amlotte two-part definition, it would be easy to
discern whether there was an attempt to perpetrate or an actual perpetration
of an enumerated felony. Instead, the more difficult question is whether
there has been a sufficient overt act toward the commission of a felony
which could, but does not, cause the death of another. Thus, under the
attempted felony murder doctrine, the key issue is discerning which acts
could have caused the death of another but did not.
Recently, in a short but major opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Gray136 receded from its holdings in Amlotte and Fleming and
found that the crime of attempted felony murder does not exist.'37 In
Gray, the defendant and two codefendants robbed a restaurant and fled in
a car. During a chase with the police, the car's driver went through a red
light and hit another car. The other car's driver was ejected and seriously
injured. Gray was convicted of the underlying robbery offense and of
attempted felony murder. On appeal, Gray questioned whether there was a
separate overt act which could, but did not, cause the death of another. The
Third District Court of Appeal found that the State had presented insuffi-
cient evidence to present a jury question of whether the alleged overt act of
131. Id. at 956 n.1.
132. Id. at 956 (citing Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Adams v. State,
341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976)).
133. 456 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1984).
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id. at 449-50.
136. 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
137. Id. at 552-53.
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running a red light could have caused the victim's death.13 As a result,
the court reversed Gray's conviction for the crime of attempted felony
murder. 39 However, the District Court of Appeal certified the question
of whether there was a sufficient overt act which could have caused the
death of another."
In a surprising decision, the supreme court did not answer the certified
question but instead receded from its holding in Amlotte and held that there
was no such crime as attempted felony murder at all."' Instead, the court
agreed with Justice Overton's dissent in Amlotte, which reasoned that
attempted felony murder is a logical impossibility. 42 The court recog-
nized that under Florida substantive law, an attempt requires that there be
proof of a specific intent to commit a specific crime. 43 The court
reasoned that since felony murder is based upon a legal fiction that supplies
the malice necessary through the commission of the underlying felony,
attempting to commit such a crime is logically impossible.'
Gray is certainly a major case with a significant effect. Under the
felony murder doctrine, as applied in Florida, some of the harshest
consequences were possible. Unlike other jurisdictions which had
recognized limits upon the application of the felony murder doctrine,"
138. Id. at 553.
139. Id.
140. The exact question certified was as follows: "WHETHER THE 'OVERT ACT'
REFERRED TO IN AMLOTIE v. STATE, 456 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1984), INCLUDES
ONE, SUCH AS FLEEING, WHICH IS INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED BUT IS NOT
INTENDED TO KILL OR INJURE ANOTHER?" Id. at 552.
141. Gray, 654 So.2d at 554.
142. Id. at 553.
143. Id. (citing Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 450 (Overton, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. (citing Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 450-51 (Overton, J., dissenting)).
145. E.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965), where the Supreme Court
of California refused to extend the felony murder doctrine to a situation where an accomplice
had been killed by an intended victim during the course of a robbery. Id. at 133-34. The
court's opinion rests partially on two theories which were used to limit the felony murder
rule. The first theory is the "protected persons" rule. Under this rule, the felony murder
doctrine only exists to protect the innocent, not felons; so that if a co-felon is killed, the
doctrine should not be used to prosecute the remaining felons for the death of someone who
was not intended to be "protected" to begin with. The second theory is the agency theory.
Under this theory, only when the act of killing is actually performed by the accused or a co-
felon should the doctrine apply. Here, since the victim could not in any way be considered
the agent of the remaining felon, the felon could not be prosecuted for the victim's actions
resulting in the one robber's death. Id.
At least one state has "limited" the felony murder doctrine by abolishing it completely.
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980).
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Florida applied the felony murder doctrine not only to acts of co-felons but
also to the acts of police officers and/or bystanders if these acts resulted in
death. Florida appeared to follow the per se application of the felony
murder doctrine. Thus, whenever a homicide occurred during a statutorily
enumerated felony, all felons were most likely to be considered to be guilty
of murder, no matter who caused the death or who the victim was.'46
Since the statutory definition of many crimes extend the life of the
underlying felony to the flight stage,'47 use of the felony murder doctrine
as a vehicle to prosecute for homicide can be extremely widespread. Use
of the felony murder doctrine to prosecute felons and co-felons for
attempted felony murder, when death did not occur, also had potentially
great consequences. Thus, under Gray abrogation of the crime of attempted
felony murder will greatly lessen the potential harshness of the felony
murder doctrine itself.148  Moreover, the courts will not be required to
decide the question of which overt acts could result in death. 149
H. Voluntary Intoxication and Mental Disease
Florida criminal law recognizes a number of defenses not explicitly
noted in the Florida Statutes. Two of these defenses are voluntary
intoxication and insanity. Under Florida criminal law, an accused charged
146. For example, under Florida law, aiders and abettors of the underlying felony
could be guilty of felony murder when the killing was done by one of their accomplices
during the felony even if the accused was not present at the time. E.g., Christie v. State, 652
So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Also, the killer does not have to be the accused
or an accomplice. Even a killing resulting from a bystander's acts can support a felony
murder conviction. See Currelly v. State, 644 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
147. See, Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 369, 378 (Fla. 1994), wherein the supreme court
upheld the defendant's felony murder conviction that occurred during flight from a robbery.
The court stated that "[t]here is no merit to ... [the] claim that a killing during flight from
the commission of a felony is not felony murder." Id. at 376.
148. For example, after Gray, several Florida courts had either vacated convictions
for attempted felony murder or noted in their opinions that such a crime no longer exists in
Florida. E.g., State v. Grinage, 656 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1995); Ward v. State, 655 So. 2d 1290
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Thus, the supreme court in Grinage did not have to decide the certified question
about whether certain acts alleged in the charge were sufficient predicates for an attempted
felony murder conviction, as the crime no longer exists in Florida. Grinage, 656 So. 2d at
458.
For a recent article praising the Gray decision but cautioning that "it is too early to
ascertain whether Gray will result in a major shift away from the application of the felony-
murder doctrine" see J. Rafael Rodriguez, Attempted Felony Murder - An Improbable Legal
Fiction Meets Its Demise, 69 FLA. BAR J. 63, 65 (1995).
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with a specific intent defense, should be found not guilty if the accused's
voluntary intoxication negated the ability to form the specific intent needed
for the crime. As for the insanity defense, Florida follows the McNaghten
rule. Under this rule, at the time of the act or acts alleged, the accused must
be suffering from such a mental disease or defect as to not know the nature
and quality of the act done or to not know that what was done was wrong.
Both defenses have been very strictly construed. Mere intoxication alone
is not a defense unless it would negate the ability to form specific intent
needed for a crime. Likewise, having a mental disease or defect alone is not
enough unless it precludes the accused's ability to know what he was doing
or to know that what he was doing was wrong. Florida has explicitly
rejected the defense of diminished capacity although it is recognized in other
jurisdictions.15
In State v. Bias'5' the supreme court was presented with the interest-
ing question of what happens when a person who raises the defense of
voluntary intoxication also has a mental disease or defect. Bias was charged
and convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. At trial, Bias raised the
defense of voluntary intoxication alleging that he had consumed eleven beers
before the commission of his crimes. Bias sought to have psychiatric
testimony from a forensic psychiatrist and a forensic psychologist that, in
their opinion, Bias was too intoxicated to form the specific intent needed
when the crimes occurred. Both experts would have relied on the fact that
Bias was suffering from schizophrenia and had brain damage. They claimed
that it was necessary to consider an individual's underlying psychiatric or
psychological condition when forming an opinion about how intoxicated that
person would become after consuming a given amount of alcohol. The
psychiatrist contended that the alcohol would have a more dramatic effect
150. Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1989). The defense of diminished
capacity allows an accused to offer evidence of any mental abnormality to show that the
defendant could or did not have the specific intent needed for the crime charged. Under this
defense, if the crime the accused is charged with has a lesser included offense not requiring
the same mens rea level as the crime charged, the accused can still be guilty of this crime.
If the specific intent crime charged did not have a lesser included offense or had one which
was also a specific intent crime, the accused would theoretically be acquitted. Sometimes
the diminished capacity defense is termed partial responsibility or partial insanity. For a
short, but detailed discussion of this defense, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. ScoTr,
JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 4.7 (2d ed. 1986).
151. 653 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995).
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on someone who was schizophrenic or had brain damage. 52 However, the
State objected to this testimony claiming that this was nothing more than the
defense of diminished capacity and that a person would have to claim
insanity before any testimony about schizophrenia would be relevant. The
trial court agreed with this objection and the experts then testified they could
not give an opinion as to Bias's intoxication without also considering his
schizophrenia. Thus, their testimony was precluded. The district court of
appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Bias's convic-
tions.'53 However, the court found that the trial court had erred in
precluding the expert testimony pertaining to his voluntary intoxication
defense. 54 The district court of appeal certified the question of whether
exclusion of the experts' testimony in this case was appropriate to the
supreme court as one of great public importance.
55
The supreme court agreed with the lower court's reversal of Bias's
conviction, and set forth specific guidelines for handling situations such as
these. 5 6  The Bias court found that when a defendant who raises the
defense of voluntary intoxication also has a mental disease or defect, the
trial court cannot exclude expert testimony about the combined effect of the
alleged mental disease and intoxication on the accused's ability to form a
specific intent if an expert cannot adequately express an opinion about the
defendant's intoxication without explaining that one of the factors used to
form the opinion is the defendant's mental disease.157 However, the
supreme court put three limitations on its holding to ensure that voluntary
intoxication defenses do not become diminished capacity defenses in
disguised forms. First, the court declared that "the focus of the expert's
testimony must be upon the defendant's intoxication, and the mental disease
or mental defect must not be the feature of the testimony."'158 Secondly,
the mental disease or defect alleged must be one "recognized by authorities
generally accepted in medicine, psychiatry, or psychology."' 59 Third, the
152. Bias v. State, 634 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), af'd, 653
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995). This psychiatrist also would have testified that he believed Bias had
used alcohol as a form of self-medication, since schizophrenics commonly did this. Id. The
expert would also have testified that this aggravates the psychotic symptoms, rather than
helping them. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Bias, 634 So. 2d at 1121.
156. Bias, 653 So. 2d at 382.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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trial court must make a preliminary determination that the proffered expert
opinion about intoxication from the combination of the intoxicants and the
recognized mental disease or defect is also "based upon authorities, studies,
and experience which have general acceptance in medicine, psychiatry,
psychology, or toxicology."''
The first limitation is clearly geared to making sure that a voluntary
intoxication defense does not become that of diminished capacity. The
second two requirements are consistent with Florida's approach to expert
testimony in other areas. Florida has long followed the Frye6' test for the
admissibility of expert testimony.1 6 Unlike the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States regarding admissibility of novel
scientific evidence and testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence,1 63
the Frye test requires that the expert testimony being proffered must be
generally accepted in a relevant scientific field or fields." Without such,
the testimony is inadmissible even though it may be the personal opinion of
the expert involved. The general acceptance needed to support an expert's
testimony can be found in published studies, text and reports.
Although Bias is clearly a conservative opinion, the court's holding
should be considered clearly correct. All individuals are not the same, and
intoxicants will affect different people in different ways. A person who
already suffers from a mental disease or defect is more likely to have his/her
mind affected by intoxicants than a person who does not have such a defect.
By limiting its holdings to factual situations where there is a recognized
mental disease or defect, the Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to
ensure that claims purporting that a less intelligent person. would be more
easily affected by intoxicants than a more intelligent person will not be
raised. Also, the effect of the mental disease or defect on the allegedly
intoxicated person must be generally recognized by some respected scientific
authorities. Personal opinion of an expert alone is not enough. Thus, while
the Supreme Court of Florida recognized "that an expert may need to
explain why a certain quantity of intoxicants causes intoxication in the
160. Id.
161. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
162. E.g., Kaminiski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952).
163. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993), the court rejected the more lenient
approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence as established in Daubert, and reaffirmed
its commitment to the more traditional approach as set forth in Frye.
164. During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down a major
evidence decision discussing a four-step approach to admission of novel scientific testimony
under Frye. Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
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defendant whereas it would not in other individuals,"' 6 5 the limitationt
under Bias should ensure that this situation will not lead to a free for all
exposing factors about the individual that would, in effect, resurrect the
defense of diminished capacity.
Two important issues were not considered in Bias. The defense in Bias
was voluntary intoxication and the question was the effect of the accused's
mental disease or defect upon his potential level of intoxication, but what
if the defense was insanity? Would evidence of a defendant's intoxication
be admissible to support the claim that this person suffering from a mental
disease or defect did not know, at that particular time, what he was doing,
or that what he was doing was wrong? Moreover, what if both defenses
were raised at trial? Bias holds that the jury could properly consider
evidence of the mental disease or defect on the voluntary intoxication
defense. Could the jury similarly consider evidence of the intoxication on
the ability to form the requisite knowledge of right from wrong or
knowledge that what tle person was doing was wrong? And if not, then
how can a jury be expected to block out evidence of intoxication when
discussing the insanity defense and then consider evidence of a mental
disease or defect when considering intoxication? 66 Neither of these
questions were answered in the Bias opinion.
Looking at these questions, perhaps what the Bias decision shows is
how difficult it is to limit the scope of expert opinion when defenses like
voluntary intoxication and insanity are raised. If the Supreme Court of
Florida should find, in a case where the insanity defense is raised, that the
defendant's level of intoxication is relevant to that question, then the
voluntary intoxication defense could be surreptitiously resurrected for certain
defenses for which it is not currently available. 67 Clearly these questions
165. Bias, 653 So. 2d at 383.
166. Theoretically, one way to do this would be with detailed, carefully crafted jury
instructions. Yet, many lawyers would argue that juries cannot be expected to compartmen-
talize their thinking to such a degree when deliberating.
167. For example, since arson is considered a general rather than a specific intent
crime, voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense to arson charges. See generally
Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). However, insanity should still be available
as a defense here.
For an article discussing the district court's opinion in Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which also held that arson was a general intent crime, see
James H. Peterson, III, Note, The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Florida: A Question of
Intent, 13 STETSON L. REv. 649 (1984). This article provides helpful background regarding
the voluntary intoxication defense in Florida.
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are important issues which the Supreme Court of Florida will ultimately
have to address.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA CRIMINAL LAWS
A. Vagueness
During this survey period, several Supreme Court of Florida opinions
have addressed due process challenges to Florida criminal statutes based
upon allegedly vague language.1 6 Criminal statutes must give a reason-
able person sufficient notice of what conduct is likely to be proscribed.
Such notice is required for a number of reasons. First, the criminal law
expects that citizens will conform their conduct so as to avoid violating the
law. Without knowing exactly what conduct violates the law, reasonable
people cannot possibly be expected to govern their actions or inactions
accordingly. Second, vague statutes allow the police undue freedom to
interpret what actions violate the law. This potentially allows the police to
arrest, search and charge citizens in an inconsistent and potentially
discriminatory manner. Third, if the statute is so vague that the conduct
which violates it is unclear, citizens can find themselves being charged at
the whim of a prosecutor. Finally, without sufficient standards as to what
conduct violates a statute, jury decision-making as to when individuals are
guilty of violating the criminal laws is not likely to be sufficiently consistent
to merit the public's confidence. Thus, vague statutes are general risks to
the rights of individual citizens and to the confidence of the general public
in the criminal system. The individual Supreme Court of Florida cases
addressing challenges to Florida Statutes based on vagueness are discussed
below.
168. In addition to these supreme court cases which discuss vagueness challenges to
some of Florida's criminal statutes, a number of district court of appeal decisions have also
dealt with vagueness challenges. No doubt by the end of next year's survey period, the
supreme court will also have rendered decisions in some of these same cases.
For further discussion on Florida caselaw concerning the issue of vagueness, see
generally State v. Bley, 652 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Mitchell, 652
So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Sailer, 645 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Habie v. Krischer, 642 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied,
651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2003 (1995); Newberger v. State, 641
So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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1. Open House Parties
In State v. Manfredonia,69 the Supreme Court of Florida considered
arguments that Florida Statutes section 856.015(2), concerning open house
parties, was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Under subsection (2) of
the statute, it is a second degree misdemeanor for an adult, in control of an
open house party, to allow the party to continue where the adult knows that
a minor is in possession of drugs or is consuming alcohol or drugs, and the
adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent such. 170 The statute defines
such terms as "drug," "open house party," and "residence;" however, the
statute does not provide a definition or explanation of what would constitute
"reasonable steps" in the prevention of the possession or consumption of the
alcoholic beverage or drug.' 7 ' Based on the vagueness of the statute's
terms the appellants in Manfredonia claimed that section 856.015(2) was
unconstitutionally vague and should be stricken. 72 Manfredonia was not
the first time that a constitutional challenge had been made to section
856.015. In an early case, State v. Alves,173 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal had found the same section to be unconstitutionally vague.174
Although the Alves court had recognized that other Florida statutes
incorporating a reasonableness standard had been found constitutional, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal found that such a standard would only be
constitutional when more specific directives were impossible. 75 Conse-
quently, the Alves court found that "[t]he actions that are available to an
observing adult in control of a residence [where the forbidden action is
occurring] are not numerous and can be selected by the legislature rather
than imposing criminal sanctions upon one who is placed in a position of
169. 649 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1995).
170. FLA. STAT. § 856.015(2) (1991). The language of Florida Statutes section
856.015(2) reads as follows:
No adult having control of any residence shall allow an open house party to take
place at said residence if any alcoholic beverage or drug is possessed or
consumed at said residence by any minor where the adult knows that an
alcoholic beverage or drug is in the possession of or being consumed by a minor
at said residence and where the adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the
possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug.
Id.
171. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1389 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 856.015(1) (1991)).
172. Id. at 1389.
173. 610 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
174. Id. at 594.
175. Id.
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guessing what is reasonable." '176 The Alves court found the legislature so
obligated and declared that its failure to provide guidelines in section
856.015(2) made the statute unconstitutionally vague.177
In addressing the question of whether section 856.015(2) was
unconstitutional in Manfredonia, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that
the section "is not a paragon of legislative drafting.' 178 However, looking
to Supreme Court of the United States decisions discussing vagueness of
criminal statutes, the supreme court found that mere lack of precision alone
would not offend due process. 179 The Manfredonia court found that all
the Supreme Court of the United States required was that a statute's
language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .""' The
court found that section 856.015(2) gave such definite warnings. Analyzing
this section's elements, the Supreme Court of Florida found that to secure
a conviction, four elements must be satisfied:
1) An adult controlling certain premises must know there is a social
gathering there; 2) a minor must possess or consume alcohol or
controlled substances during this gathering; 3) the adult must have
actual knowledge of the minor's acts; and 4) the adult in control must
both (a) allow the party to continue and (b) fail to take any reasonable
steps to prevent the possession or consumption."'1
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, these requirements put a heavy
burden on the state to prove that the adult in charge took no steps whatsoev-
er to prevent the consumption or possession of the alcohol or drugs.182
The court suggested that an adult controlling such a party could avoid
criminal charges by simply stopping the party or taking some other
reasonable action to prevent the consumption or possession after learning
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1390.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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thereof. 83 Unfortunately, the Manfredonia decision did not give any
concrete examples of what would constitute reasonable action.'84
2. Exploitation of Aged Persons or Disabled Adults
In Cuda v. State,'85 the Supreme Court of Florida sustained a vague-
ness challenge to former Florida Statutes section 415.111(5) which
prohibited the exploitation for profit of a disabled person or adult.'86 This
section made it a third-degree felony for anyone to exploit an aged or
disabled adult "by the improper or illegal use or management" of such
person's property. 87 The accused had been charged with one count of
exploitation of an aged person for profit. At the trial court level, Cuda
successfully argued that the words "improper or illegal" were unconstitu-
tionally vague. The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the word
"improper" did not provide sufficient warning of the prohibited conduct and
was unconstitutionally vague. 88 However, the court found that the use of
the word "illegal" was specific enough to satisfy constitutional stan-
dards. 89 The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but important decision,
reversed the appellate court's decision and agreed that the term "illegal" was
also vague, thus making the entire subsection unconstitutionally vague.19°
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court had to distinguish
between two earlier cases in which it held similar language to be constitu-
tional. In State v. Rodriguez,19' the court had upheld a statute which
contained a proscription against acts "not authorized by law."' 92 Florida
Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) criminalized certain acts regarding the food
183. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1391.
184. Id. The Manfredonia court also declined to comment on whether the appellants'
actions, which were not mentioned in either the district court or supreme court opinion,
violated Florida Statutes section 856.015(2) (1991). Id.
185. 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994).
186. Id. at 25.
187. Florida Statutes section 415.111(5) reads as follows: "A person who knowingly
or willfully exploits an aged person or disabled adult by the improper or illegal use or
management of the funds, assets, property, power of attorney, or guardianship of such aged
person or disabled adult for profit, commits a felony of the third degree ...." FLA. STAT.
§ 415.111(5) (1991).
188. State v. Cuda, 622 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626
So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1993), and quashed by 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994).
189. Id. at 504-05.
190. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23-24.
191. 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978).
192. Id. at 160.
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stamps program when the acts done were "not authorized by law."193
Despite such broad language, the supreme court found that because of the
program's peculiar nature and because chapter 409 itself gave notice that
there were federal regulations governing the program, these words actually
meant "not authorized by state and federal food stamp law."194 Thus, the
court felt that constitutional notice problems were alleviated when this
particular section was read in conjunction with the rest of the chapter.
However, in Locklin v. Pridgeon,95 the supreme court had struck down
a statute containing the exact same language. Former Florida- Statutes
section 839.22 made it unlawful for any officer of the federal government
to "commit any act under color of authority .. .[of their position] when
such act is not authorized by law ... .",196 This statute was considered
unconstitutionally vague, because it required every governmental employee
to determine what acts where authorized by law and what acts were not
authorized by law." 7 Failure to do so could result in a criminal offense.
The "law" in Locklin was not limited to an narrow area; like the "law" in
Rodriguez. Thus, people could mean any and all laws, civil or criminal.
Even if a public officer violated a law in good faith, he could be prosecuted.
Thus, one could never know how to govern their conduct in order to avoid
violating the section without having all encompassing knowledge of all the
laws-something which was definitely an impossible task. 98
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the statute in Cuda was more
like the unconstitutional one in Locklin than the one upheld in Rodri-
guez.'99 The Rodriguez case's statute had the federal laws as a back drop,
thus providing the needed notice to make the statute' constitutional.
However, in Locklin, section 415.111(5) had no specific laws as a back
drop. Instead, the statute criminalized any "illegal" act in using or
193. Rodriguez dealt with a challenge to Florida Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) (Supp.
1976). Id. at 158. Present Florida Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) still contains this
challenged statutory language. FLA. STAT. § 409.325(2)(a) (1994).
194. Rodriguez, 365 So. 2d at 159.
195. 30 So. 2d 102 (1947).
196. Id. at 103 (citing FLA. STAT. § 839.22 (1945)).
197. Id.
198. The court did not specifically note this as the reason for finding the section
constitutionally infirm, but its opinion implies this was so. There also appears to be another
vagueness problem with the section. Did "law" mean Florida law, federal law, or any state's
law? The section did not make this clear.
199. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23-24.
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managing the funds of a criminal person. This statute was thus found too
vague to give sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct involved.200
The Supreme Court of Florida did suggest methods for drafting a
similar statute so that challenges to its constitutionality could be avoided.
First, the court noted that there were at least seven other states with similar
statutes to those in Florida.20 ' However, it also noted that none of the
statutes which were worded similar to Florida's statute inflicted criminal
sanctions.21 One state, Illinois, did impose criminal sanctions for finan-
cial exploitation of the elderly.203 However, the Illinois statute was quite
specific in defining the conduct prohibited. This statute made it a crime
when a person "knowingly and by deception or intimidation obtains control
over the elderly or disabled person's property with the intent to permanently
deprive . . . [that person] of his property. 2t 4  The statute specifically
defined what constituted "intimidation" and "deception., 25 Additionally,
the Illinois statute provided that someone who made a good faith effort to
manage an elderly or disabled person's property could not be subject to
criminal liability under this law.2° The Supreme Court of Florida noted
that in contrast to the Illinois law, Florida's law "contains no clear
explanation of the proscribed conduct, no explicit definition of terms, nor
any good faith defense. 20 7  Thus, this statute was unconstitutionally
vague.
20 8
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this discussion was the supreme
court's criticism of section 415.111(5) for its failure to provide a good faith
defense. The court seems to be clearly suggesting that any such law, to be
constitutional, must contain a specific, instead of a general, intent require-
ment.209 Evidently, without such a requirement, the Supreme Court of
Florida feared that such a criminal provision would be a strict liability law.
Thus, a guardian who failed to manage the funds of a disabled person in a
200. Id. at 24.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, (Smith-Hurd 1993)).
204. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 24 n.3 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/16-1.3
(Smith-Hurd 1993)).
205. Id. at 24.
206. Id. at 24-25.
207. Id. at 25.
208. Id.
209. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23. The Illinois law not only contained a statutory "good
faith" exemption, but it also was clearly a specific intent law as it required "the intent to
permanently deprive." Id. at 24 n.3.
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manner required by law could find him or herself criminally liable even
though there was no intent to injure the ward in any manner. Clearly, the
intent of this law seems to protect elderly or disabled persons from
intentional financial abuse by their guardians or other individuals in charge
of them or their property. One of the statute's obvious goals is to protect
elderly or disabled persons against the theft or deprivation of their property.
Thus, in a way, former section 415.111(5) could be viewed as a special kind
of theft statute. The Supreme Court of the United States has previously held
that statutes comparable to common law theft crimes must contain a specific
intent requirement in order to be constitutional.21 Although the Supreme
Court of Florida does not say this explicitly in Cuda, any legislative attempt
to rewrite section 415.111(5) would be wise to contain such a requirement.
During the 1995 legislative session, the Florida Legislature attempted
to deal with the effects of this decision. The legislature first repealed the
language in section 415.111(5) which was found unconstitutional in
Cuda 1' The legislature then created a new chapter, chapter 825, to
address the problems found in Cuda.2" 2 New Florida Statutes section
825.103(1)(a) makes it a crime for anyone who "[s]tands in a position of
trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with the elderly person
or disabled adult and knowingly"2 3 uses deception or intimidation to
obtain that person's property for the temporary or permanent use of the
offending person or a third person. The offense can be either a first, second
or third-degree felony depending upon the value of the property in-
volved.214 The language of section 825.103(1)(a) is very similar to that
of the Illinois statute noted with approval in Cuda. While the Illinois statute
only dealt with permanent deprivation, Florida criminal law recognizes that
even a knowing temporary deprivation of another's property for the benefit
of someone other the owner is theft. Additionally, section 825.101
specifically defines "deception," "intimidation," "position of trust and
210. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
211. Ch. 95-140, §4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 104, 105 (West).
212. Ch. 95-158, §§ 2-8, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1263, 1264 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 825.101-825.106, 39.0001).
213. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1266 (to codified at FLA. STAT. §
825.103(1)(a)).
214. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(2)(a)-(c)). If the property is valued
at $100,000 or more, the crime is a first-degree felony. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
825.103(2)(a)). If the property is less than $100,000 but at least $20,000, the crime is a
second-degree felony. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(2)(b)). If the property's
value is less than $20,000, the offense is a third-degree felony. Ch. 95-158, § 4, 1995 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. at 1266 (to be codified at FLA.. STAT. § 825.103(2)(c)).
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confidence," and "business relationship," thus following the Illinois example.
Finally, Florida Statutes section 825.105, addresses the last problem noted
in Cuda. Good faith efforts which do not result in effective assistance or
management of property are not subject to criminal sanctions. In short,
chapter 825 clearly seems to have been drafted and passed with the Cuda
decision in mind. Indeed, given the supreme court's decision in Cuda,
vagueness challenges to Florida Statutes section 825.103(1)(a) should be
swiftly and correctly rejected.215
B. Right to Privacy Challenges to Crimes Involving Sexual
Relations with Children
As previously noted, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases
concerning the constitutionality of statutes involving sexual relations with
children. Surprisingly, the court arrived at diametrically opposed results.
The first case, Jones v. State,2 16 involved the constitutionality of Florida
Statutes section 800.04, concerning a lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or
act upon or in the presence of a child.217  The second case, B.B. v.
State,2" 8 involved the constitutionality of section 794.05, concerning carnal
intercourse with an unmarried person under eighteen years,219 when
applied to consensual sexual relations between minors. Both constitutional
challenges in these cases were predicated upon the right to privacy
amendment of the Florida Constitution.220  Both defendants argued that
the supreme court's decision in re T. W.,221 which struck down statutory
barriers to a minor's right to have an abortion without parental approval,
mandated that both section 800.04 and section 794.05 be declared unconsti-
215. Florida Statutes section 825.103(1) actually establishes two offenses against
elderly or disabled adults. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1)(a), (b)). Section
825.103(1)(b) makes it a crime to obtain the property of an elderly or disabled person for
someone else's benefit, when the person obtaining "[k]nows or should know" that the victim
"lacks the capacity to consent." Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1)(b)). "Lacks
capacity to consent" is specifically defined in section 825.101(9). Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. at 1264 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.101(9)). This offense is a felony
whose degree depends on the value of the property involved. Although this offense was not
discussed in Cuda, section 825.103(1)(b) also appears to have been drafted with the Cuda
decision in mind. Vagueness challenges to its constitutionality should also be easily rejected.
216. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
217. Id. at 1085 (citing FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991)).
218. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
219. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991)).
220. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
221. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989).
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tutional. In T.W., the challenged statutory provision allowed the minor to
consent, without parental approval, to any medical procedure except an
abortion.2 2  In declaring this statutory prohibition unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the Florida constitutional right to
privacy is extremely broad and applies to both adults and minors.223 Since
minors enjoyed the constitutional right to privacy as well as adults, the court
in T.W. considered whether the State had an overriding state interest that
could restrict the minor's right to an abortion.224 Finding no such compel-
ling interest, the court found that the statute in question there unconstitution-
al.2
25
1. Lewd, Lascivious, or Indecent Assault Upon a Child
Florida Statutes section 800.04 criminalizes various sexual acts with
children under sixteen. In Jones v. State, the defendant was charged under
section 800.04(2) for having sexual relations with a minor under six-
teen. 26 Jones argued that based upon the expansive right to privacy for
minors announced in T.W., that portion of section 800.04 providing that
consent is not a defense to sexual relations with minors must also be
considered unconstitutional.227 Jones admitted to having sexual relations
with a person under sixteen but was denied at trial the right to raise this
person's consent as a defense. The district court of appeal framed the issue
as "whether a minor under sixteen years of age has a right, protected by
Florida's constitutional right of privacy, to engage in consensual sex. 228
If so, this right could not be denied by prosecuting a person with whom the
minor had sexual relations, thus mandating that the particular language of
section 800.04 be considered unconstitutional. Jones argued that in this
case, the minors had not been harmed and that they had wanted to engage
in personal sexual relations. Therefore, the minors did not want any of the
222. Id. at 1189-90.
223. Id. at 1193.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1194.
226. See Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted,
629 So. 2d 133 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Rodriguez v. State, 629 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1993), and
affid, Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
227. Id. at 419. The specific language Jones challenged was that "[n]either the
victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this
section." FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991).
228. Jones, 619 So. 2d at 420.
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protection offered by the statute. The district court found this irrelevant and
upheld the section's constitutionality.229
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the purpose of the law was
to protect minors from "sexual exploitation, physical harm, and sometimes
psychological damage, [stemming from sexual relations], regardless of the
child's maturity or lack of chastity. 230  The court noted an important
distinction between the statute involved in T.W. and the section involved
here. In T.W., the pregnant minor could consent to any number of surgical
medical procedures except an abortion. Thus, she had been statutorily
granted the right to consent with respect to certain procedures and was only
denied the right to have an abortion. As the supreme court noted, "[In re]
T.W. did not transform a minor into an adult for all purposes.,,23' The
court noted that the right of privacy granted to minors did not vitiate all
legislative authority to protect minors from the conduct of others, especially
when the conduct involves an adult, as opposed to a minor.232 As a result,
the court found a compelling state interest in protecting children from sexual
activity and exploitation before they physically and mentally reach
23323
maturity. Therefore, section 800.04 was declared constitutional.2 4
2. Carnal Intercourse with Unmarried Person Under
Eighteen Years
Following the decision in Jones, the Supreme Court of Florida in B.B.
v. State2 35 considered a similar constitutional attack on section 794.05.
This attack was once again predicated on the In re T.W. decision and the
Florida Constitution's privacy amendment. Factually, there appears to be
one significant difference between the two cases. In Jones, the consensual
sexual relations occurred between an adult and a minor under sixteen years
of age. In B.B., the consensual sexual relations occurred between two
sixteen-year-olds. Also, unlike section 800.04 in Jones, section 794.05
protects only previously chaste minors under eighteen, and not all minors in
general. Thus, the supreme court found that the issues in the two cases
were very different. The court phrased the issue as "whether a minor who
229. Id. at 422.
230. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994).
231. Id. at 1087.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258-59.
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engages in 'unlawful' carnal intercourse with an unmarried minor of
previous chaste character can be adjudicated delinquent of a felony of the
second degree in light of the minor's right to privacy guaranteed by the
Florida Constitution.236
As in Jones, the court found that the defendant here had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in carnal intercourse.237 Thus, the question again
was whether there could be a compelling state interest restricting this
expectation. The court, as in Jones, recognized that a minor's right to
engage in sexual intercourse is not absolute and can be restricted.238
However, unlike the decision in Jones, the court found that, as applied to
the facts of this case, the state had failed to carry its burden to adjudicate
the minor delinquent as a second-degree felon.239 The court found that a
much different situation exists when there are minor/minor sexual relations
as opposed to adult/minor sexual relations.2' In the adult/minor situation,
as in Jones, prevention of the adult's sexual exploitation of the minor is the
compelling reason for the statute's constitutionality. 24' However, in the
minor/minor situation, the State has an interest in protecting both minors
from sexual activity for reasons of health and quality of life.242 Thus,
since the interest of both minors were involved in B.B., prosecuting one of
them was not considered the least intrusive means of furthering the State's
compelling interest.243
The B.B. court also criticized the statutory language of Florida Statutes
section 794.05. The court found that this section only applied to previously
chaste minors, and not all minors.2' Thus, the purpose of the statute
could not be to protect all minors from sexual activities, since it only
applied to those who had not previously engaged in sexual activities.
Instead, the court found that the statute, as applied here, was being used "as
a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent. 245  Thus, the statute was
declared unconstitutional.246
236. Id. at 258.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 259.
239. Id.
240. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 259-60.
245. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
246. Id.
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Despite some misleading newspaper headlines,247 the decision in B.B.
does not legitimize all consensual sexual relations between minors. As
Justice Kogan pointed out in his concurring opinion, section 800.04 might
serve, in certain situations, to provide a vehicle for prosecution.24 Under
that statute neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is
a defense. Admittedly, Jones did not consider a minor/minor sexual relation
situation. However, the court could possibly find that sexual relations
between a sixteen-year-old or a seventeen-year-old minor and one under the
age of sixteen are much different than the situation confronting it in B.B.
In the former situations, the older minor clearly could be statutorily
presumed as being the more mature party, thus meriting prosecution despite
the consent of his/her sexual partner. At any rate, the supreme court did not
rule on this particular question in B.B., so it remains to be settled in future
cases.
C. Improper Delegation of Powers
During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida had a rare
opportunity to discuss the delegation of powers doctrine in the context of a
criminal case. The delegation doctrine is based upon the principle of
separation of powers. Under this principle, one branch of government
cannot exercise the powers of another branch. In B.H. v. State,24 9 the
Supreme Court of Florida, in an interesting discussion of apparent first
impression, addressed the issue of how extensive a role an administrative
agency may take in defining the elements of a crime.
Former Florida Statutes section 39.061, which is part of the Florida
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990,250 made it a third-degree felony to
"escape from any secure detention or any residential commitment facility of
restrictiveness level VI or above . .,."" Former Florida Statutes section
39.01(61)252 defined "restrictiveness level' 253 and required the state
247. See Mark Silva, Sex Between Youths Ruled Legal, MIAMI HERALD, June 30,
1995, at 5B.
248. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260 n.2 (Kogan, J., concurring).
249. 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995).
250. Id. at 987 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.0205 (Supp. 1990)).
251. FLA. STAT. § 39.061 (1991).
252. Id. at 989 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.01(61) (1991)). The definitions contained
in Florida Statutes section 39.01 apply to chapter 39 as a whole.
253. "Restrictiveness level" was defined as: "[The identification of broad custody
categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure
residential." B.H., 645 So. 2d at 989 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.01(61) (Supp. 1990)).
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Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") to establish
various restrictiveness levels, as long as no more than eight such levels were
established. Pursuant to this authority, the department had established four
restrictiveness levels, numbered two, four, six, and eight. B.H. had pled
nolo contendere, with leave to challenge the constitutionality of former
section 39.061 on appeal, involving a charge of escaping in March, 1992
from a level six juvenile facility. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
rejected the claim that this law represented an unconstitutional delegation of
power.254 The Supreme Court of Florida granted review due to the
conflict between this and another district court of appeal decision.255
Before deciding this precise question, the supreme court reviewed what
the delegation doctrine is based upon. Under the Florida Constitution, all
political power belongs to the people,26 and it is for them to say how
these powers may be exercised. The court noted that Florida has established
a three-part government based upon the separation of powers doctrine.
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution expressly divides the state
government into three branches; legislative, executive, and the judicial.5 7
This article and section expressly provide that "[n]o person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein. 258 Thus, the Florida Constitution has
textually adopted a strict separation of powers doctrine. If any state statute
attempts to give to one branch power assigned to another branch by the
Florida Constitution, then that statute represents an unconstitutional delega-
tion of powers. Under the Florida Constitution,5 9 the legislature has the
power to pass laws and to declare what these laws are. Any delegation of
this power violates the constitution. The supreme court found that this
legislative power encompasses the ability to define criminal defenses. In the
area of criminal law, the court noted that the concept of separation of
powers in the non-delegation doctrine is also linked to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. This due process guarantee is found in article I,
section 9 of the constitution and requires that a criminal statute reasonably
254. B.H. v. State, 622 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 632 So.
2d 1025 (Fla.), approved in part, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2559 (1995).
255. D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
256. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
257. Id. art. II, § 3.
258. Id.
259. Id. art. III, § 1.
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apprise citizens of the acts that it prohibits.2 ° When the legislature by
statute delegates to another branch of government the power to define what
a criminal offense is, both the non-delegation and the due process doctrine
are violated. Under these doctrines, the attempt to give an administrative
agency the authority to define what is criminal would be clearly unconstitu-
tional.
The Supreme Court of Florida in B.H. found that both the due process
and the non-delegation doctrines were violated by former Florida Statutes
section 39.061.261 The statute declared that escape from a residential
commitment facility of restrictiveness level six or above was a felony.
However, the statute did not attempt to define what such residential
commitment facilities were. Instead, the legislature gave to HRS the ability
to define restrictiveness levels in terms of broad custody categories based on
the needs of the children. The only limitation on this authority was that
there could be no more than eight such restrictiveness levels. The court
found that while this delegation may have created a minimum standard, it
did not create a maximum standard beyond which HRS could not go.262
While B.H. did not address the general issue of "how much of a role may
administrative agencies take in defining the elements of crime,"' 63 the
supreme court did state that any delegations "must expressly articulate
reasonably definite standards of implementation that do not merely grant
open-ended authority, but that impose an actual limit-both minimum and
maximum -on what the agency may do."2" Here, former section 39.061
imposed a minimum limit but did not impose any maximum restriction on
the ability of HRS to define restrictiveness levels. In essence, HRS was
improperly delegated the ability to define an essential element of what
constituted juvenile escape in Florida, thus causing that part of the statute
to be unconstitutional.
Former Florida Statutes section 39.061 not only criminalized escape
from a juvenile commitment facility, but it also made it a crime to escape
from a secure detention facility. While there was no improper delegation
of legislative authority as far as the definition of what constituted a secure
detention facility the supreme court felt that it could not sever the unconsti-
260. Id. art. I, § 9.
261. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 993-94.
262. Id. at 994.
263. Id. at 990. The court did note that it believed that "[ilt clearly is impossible to
adopt a single bright-line test to apply to all alleged violations of the nondelegation doctrine."
Id. at 993.
264. Id. at 994.
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tutional part of section 39.061 from the rest of the statute. If such a
severance was performed, it would be a crime to escape from a pretrial
secure detention facility, but not from a post-trial commitment facility. This
situation created an absurd situation which the legislature could not have
intended. Thus, the entire statute was found unconstitutional.265
Although the B.H. decision provides an instructive and interesting
discussion of the delegation doctrine, as applied to the criminal law, its
result is of little practical effect for two reasons.26 First, the court's
conclusion that former section 39.061 was unconstitutional did not help B.H.
in any way. In addition, the supreme court in B.H. decided that declaring
former section 39.061 unconstitutional did not automatically leave Florida
without a statute governing an escape from a juvenile commitment facility.
Instead, the court found that under the doctrine of statutory revival, former
Florida Statutes section 39.112267 was automatically revived. This section
was the immediate past predecessor of the unconstitutional section 39.061
and was itself constitutional. Thus, Florida still had a juvenile escape law
under which B.H. was found delinquent.2 68  Second, and even more
importantly, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.061 well before the
supreme court decided this case.269 Present section 39.061 makes it a
crime to escape from either a secure detention facility or from any
residential commitment facility defined in section 39.01 (58).270 These two
definitions do not delegate to HRS or any other administrative agency the
task of defining what constitutes such facilities. Instead, the two sections
265. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994.
266. During this survey period, one district court of appeal did cite B.H. in its
decision finding that the language in former Florida Statutes section 790.001(4) partially
defining a "destructive device" for purposes of chapter 790 as including "any device declared
a destructive device by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms" was an improper
delegation of authority to an administrative agency. State v. Mitchell, 652 So. 2d 473, 478
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.001(4) (1991)). However, the court
found that this language could be severed from the rest of section 790.001(4). Id. When this
was done, the remaining definitions in this part met constitutional standards and survived.
Id. at 478-79.
267. FLA. STAT. § 39.112 (1989).
268. See also S.W.M. v. State, 647 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(upholding a conviction for escape from a halfway house in 1992). This case noted that B.H.
had declared former Florida Statutes section 39.061 unconstitutional but also noted that B.H.
had found the previous escape statute automatically by its decision. Id. Thus, the delinquen-
cy adjudication in S.W.M. was affirmed. Id.
269. See 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-287.
270. Ch. 95-152, § 12,1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1229, 1243 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39.061).
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provide criteria for establishing which children should be placed in these
facilities and examples of what kinds of programs fall within the parameters
of HRS authority. Thus, the unconstitutional delegation problems found in
B.H. do not exist under the present version of section 39.061.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida yearly decides a number of important
cases in the field of substantive criminal law. Certainly this statement was
true for the period covered by this survey. The majority of the court's
opinions settled more issues than they raised. Unfortunately, even after
Young27 and Bias,272 there still remain serious issues to explore regard-
ing both felony petit theft charges, and the voluntary intoxication and
insanity defenses.
In the decisions addressing constitutional challenges to some of
Florida's substantive criminal laws, the supreme court's detailed opinions in
both Cuda,273 regarding exploitation of the elderly and disabled, and in
B.H.,274 regarding escape from juvenile commitment facilities, provided
extensive guidance on how to correct the constitutional deficiencies found
there. Thus, the Florida Legislature was able to respond quickly and
effectively to pass new laws in these areas which should withstand future
constitutional challenges.
271. 641 So. 2d at 401.
272. 653 So. 2d at 380.
273. 639 So. 2d at 22.
274. 645 So. 2d at 987.
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